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KNABE v. KNABE

FURTHER ON "ALIMONY" FOR THE SUPPORT
OF BOTH WIFE AND CHILD
Knabe v. Knabe'
In the decree of March 5, 1935, granting the wife an
absolute divorce and custody of the children, the trial
court included, in accordance with an agreement between
the parties, an order that the husband-father pay separate
sums of $10.00 per week for permanent alimony, and $8.00
per week for the support and maintenance of the minor
children. On October 25, 1935, a petition by the father for
the custody of the children was dismissed, and the trial
court directed that he pay to the mother "as alimony, and
for the support and maintenance of the infant children
$14.00 per week." The father, on June 20, 1936, consented
to this being raised to $16.00 per week. On petition of
the mother of December 6, 1938, this joint allowance was
first raised to $30.00 per week and then, by order of January 26th, 1939, set at $21.00 per week.
In opposition to this last-named order the husband
contended that the allowance in the decree of March 5,
1935, was not alimony, and hence was not subject to any
modification, because based upon an agreement of the parties; that the trial court lacked the power to combine the
orders for wife and children into one order; and that the
attachment issued should be vacated. On appeals from
the various orders, held: That the trial court did have the
power so to modify its original order for alimony and support, and that the husband-father could be punished for
contempt for non-compliance.
With reference to the form of the decree and the power
to punish for contempt, this casenote forms a sequel to the
earlier one on the Cohen case.2 It was there pointed out
that Bushman v. Bushmaie had decided that, whereas a
separate order for alimony for the wife could be enforced
by punishment for contempt of court, that sanction could
not be imposed for violation of a separate order for support and maintenance of minor children, because to do so
would violate the Maryland Constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. The problem in the Cohen
case was whether a single order of a divorce court, pro1 6 A. (2nd) 366 (Md. 1939).
2 Cohen v. Cohen, 197 A. 564 (Md. 1938), discussed in Note, "Alimony"
for the Suspport of Both Wife and OChld (1938), 3 Md. L. Rev. 93.
s 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
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viding one sum periodically for both the wife and minor
children, could be enforced by contempt sentence without
violating the constitutional prohibition. It was there decided that the contempt sentence could, constitutionally,
be imposed. Thus, in the case now under discussion, if
the latest order was itself properly entered, a violation of
it could be punished by a contempt sentence.
In the earlier casenote on the Cohen case a query was
stated' as to one of the points which was raised in the
later Knabe case now under discussion. This was whether
the trial court had the power, over the objection of the
husband-father, to make a single order embracing both
alimony and support in one item, and whether the husbandfather, by timely appeal (which was not done in the Cohen
case) could get a reversal on the form of the order. For
lack of any authority, the point was treated in the earlier
casenote only by speculation, although implicit in the approval of the Cohen case was the suggestion that the
answer to the query should be that the trial court does
possess the power to combine the orders into one for a
single sum.
While that point was involved in the Knabe case, yet
the Court did not have to answer it squarely, as they were
able to answer appellant's contention involving it by pointing out' his waiver of it through his consent to an order
in a similar form at an earlier stage of the proceedings. A
strong dictum, however, gives some insight into the Court's
view of the subject. Said the Court:' ". .
it is not
apparent why it (the trial court) had not also the correlative power of changing the form of the 'allowance." Further
language regarding the desirability of considering the
children's needs in fixing the amount for the wife, and
treating of the flexibility of the single order for both, also
goes to show the Court's answer to the query to be one
approving the practice.
In addition to contesting the power of the trial court
to modify the orders as it did, the appellant apparently
also contested the later orders on the theory that the trial
court had no power to modify the original order for alimony in any fashion, because, so he contended, that order
was entered by the consent of the parties, was not true
alimony, and was incapable of modification.
5

Supra n. 2, 3 Md. L. Rev. 93, 96-7.
6 A. (2nd) 366, 371.

1 Ibid.
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In dealing with the question of the modification of a
divorce decree with respect to alimony, two Maryland
cases must always be kept in mind. Marshall v. Marshall7
held that where an absolute divorce was granted the wife,
with neither any alimony being awarded her, nor power
reserved in the decree later to reopen the case to award it,
the Court could not later award it. On the other hand, if
some alimony was awarded, or if the power was so reserved, or if the case were an a mensa one or an award of
'alimony without divorce, then the jurisdiction of the Court
remained later to modify. Emerson v. Emerson5 held that
where the order for alimony was incorporated into the
decree by consent of the parties, and was of such a nature
as the court, of its own motion and over the objection of
the husband, could not have entered, the order could not be
subsequently modified. Thus, consent decrees for lump
sum payments 9 or for periodical payments to continue beyond the joint lives of the spouses" are incapable of subsequent modification, as not being "true" alimony.
In the case now under discussion, the Court had no
trouble in getting around the Marshall case, inasmuch as
some alimony had been awarded, which fact always continues the jurisdiction of the Court to modify the award
for supervening circumstances. The Emerson case presented more difficulty, but that, too, was surmounted. The
Court pointed out that if the allowance of the decree falls
within the definition of alimony, even though founded on
agreement, the Court retains the same power over it as if
there had been no agreement. The agreement in this case
contemplated periodical payments, not to go beyond the
joint lives of the parties, and consequently was of a nature
which the Court itself could have imposed without consent.
This being so, the consent nature of the original decree did
not prevent its modification. This is particularly so in
view of the fact that the decree only incorporated the
amount and specified due date of the payments and substituted "subject to the further order of this Court" for
the contractual provisions terminating the payments upon
the remarriage of the wife or the death of either.
One statement of the Court in the opinion needs to be
queried. This is to the effect that "alimony ceases uncon7 162

Md. 116, 159 A. 260, 83 A. L. R. 1237 (1932).
S120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913).
9 As in Bushman v. Bushman, supra n. 3, 157 Md. 166, 171 et seq.
10 As in the Emerson case.
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ditionally upon the wife's remarriage.' '10a The opinion
made this statement in that fashion, after quoting from
Hood v. Hood" to the same general effect. Examination
of the Hood case discloses that the statement quoted was
entirely dictum, supposedly supported by the Wallingsford,12 McCaddin,"3 and Emerson'4 cases. The dictum
was to the effect that the death of either, the remarriage
of the wife, or the reunion of the spouses, caused alimony
to cease. Examination of the Wallingsford and McCaddin
cases indicates that they were treating only of death or reunion. The Emerson case does not support the Hood
dictum but, quite the contrary, indicates that the alimony
does not cease automatically, but rather that the husband
must petition the Court to be relieved because of the wife's
remarriage and ". . . there may exist facts and conditions that would induce the Court to withhold this relief. "
Furthermore, examination of the remaining cases cited
in the opinion in the Knabe case' 6 to support the statement
that alimony ceases upon the remarriage of the wife, discloses that not one of them, even by so much as a casual
dictum, bears out the point, and that the only reference
in any to remarriage is in one case 7 where a husband sought
relief because of his wife's remarriage and was denied it
because the alimony decreed was consent alimony and not
true alimony and hence was incapable of modification under
the doctrine of the Emerson case. That case gives no hint
as to what would be the effect of remarriage on the modification or termination of true alimony. Most of the cases
cited, like the Wallingsford and McCaddin cases, merely
bear out that part of the dictum which terminates true alimony on the death of either spouse or the resumption of cohabitation. 8
10

a 6 A. (2nd) 366, 368-9. The statement quoted is at 6 A. (2nd) 369.
A similar statement is part of a more general statement found at the
bottom of page 368 and top of page 369.
11 138 Md. 355, 365, 113 A. 895, 899 (1921).
12 Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485, 488 (1821).
"2McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 573, 82 A. 554 (1911).
14 Supra n. 8.
15 Ibid, 120 Md. 584, 596.
16 Viz., the Keerl, Hokamp v. Hagaman, Helms v. Franciscus, Jamison,
Polley, Newbold, Blades v. Szatai, Bushman, and Cohen cases, all cited in
the opinion in the Knabe case at the beginning of page 369 of 6 A. (2nd).
17 Newbold v. Newbold, 133 Md. 170, 104 A. 366 (1918).
18 The cases mentioning resumption of cohabitation are, obviously, ones
thinking in terms of divorce a mensa, or of alimony without divorce. On
the other hand, remarriage becomes a problem when alimony is granted
after an a vinculo divorce.

